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GENETIC SCREENING: THE CASE
OF BRCA11
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff, Ph.D.'
INTRODUCTION
WITH THE ADVANCE OF GENETIC screening proce-
dures, it has become possible to identify genes responsible for
a number of diseases. Although it is hoped that one day it will
be possible to cure such diseases through genetic engineering
applied in utero, that is not yet a reality. As a result, the only
possibilities we have are the following: 1) to abort the affected
fetus; 2) to allow the fetus to go to term and then deal with the
disease in whatever ways we can (which, of course, varies with
the disease); or 3) not to do such screenings altogether so as
not to tempt those involved to abort.
The responses to these three possibilities vary not only
among religions, but in fact, within any given religion authori-
ties may and do differ. Furthermore, how a particular authority
I. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Murray, Professor and Director of the Center
for Biomedical Ethics of Case Western University for involving me in this project and for
supplying me with articles on the BRCA1 mutation associated with cancer.
The following Judaic scholarly and biblical sources were utilized by the author. Mishnah
(version edited c. 200 C.E.); Tosefta (version edited c. 200 C.E.); Jerusalem Talmud (version
edited c. 400 C.E.); Babylonian Talmud (version edited c. 500 C.E.); MAIMONIDES' MISHNEH
TORAH (completed 1177 C.E.); and JOSEPH KARO'S SHULHAM ARUKH (completed 1565 C.E.).
Note on sources with no published English translation available: All sources that were unavailable
in English were individually translated by the author, a scholar in Judaic Studies. While opinions
may differ as to exact translation of such texts, Rabbi Dorff's interpretations and translations are
deferred to for purposes of this Article.
t Jewish Theological Seminary of America, ordained as Conservative rabbi, 1970; Ph.D.
philosophy, Columbia University, 1971. Rabbi Dorff serves as Rector and Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Judaism in Los Angeles, and is Vice-Chair of the Conservative
Movement's Committee on Jewish Law and Standards. In spring 1993, he served on the Ethics
Committee of President Clinton's Health Care Task Force.
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responds to a given disease or condition may not be the same
as how it would respond to another. For example, how one
responds to the information that a fetus has a debilitating but
non-fatal condition like Down's Syndrome may or may not
differ from the way in which one responds to news of a fatal
genetic disease like Tay-Sachs. Some religious authorities
would not give a general answer as to how to respond to a
given condition. Instead, they would only answer on a case-by-
case basis, reasoning that the couple's personal situation and
values and their psychological, economic, familial, and other
resources may all affect the decision as to what is appropriate
in a given case.
In recent years, research has suggested that a mutation on
the BRCA1 gene appears in Ashkenazic-Jewish women more
frequently than it does in the general population and that those
who have this mutation are more likely to suffer from breast or
ovarian cancer than those who do not. Those findings make the
questions surrounding screening for this disease, and possibly
aborting because of it, of particular interest to Jews. This Arti-
cle, then, will present and focus the Jewish discussion of the
issues surrounding the BRCA1 mutation.
First, it is helpful to put the questions raised by this find-
ing into the larger context of how Judaism understands medi-
cine in general, and abortion more specifically. I shall then
review and evaluate rabbinic responses to those genetic diseas-
es which have been discussed in the past, such as Downs Syn-
drome and Tay-Sachs, and then, based on this foundation, I
shall formulate a Jewish response to the new information about
BRCA1.
A. Medical Care in Jewish Theology and Law
Judaism's positions on issues in health care generally, and
on genetic screening in particular, stem from two of its under-
lying principles: (1) that the body belongs to God; and (2) that
human beings have both the permission and the obligation to
heal.
[Vol. 7:65
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1. The Body Belongs to God
In Judaism, God owns everything, including our bodies.2
God loans them to us for the duration of our lives, and they
are returned to God when we die. The immediate implication
of this principle is that neither men nor women have the right
to govern their bodies in any manner they please. Rather, since
God created our bodies and owns them, God can and does
assert the right to restrict the use of our bodies according to the
rules articulated in Jewish law.
One set of rules requires us to take reasonable care of our
bodies. The analogy can be made to the loaning of an apart-
ment: just as one would have the obligation to take reasonable
care of the apartment while using it, so too one has the duty to
take care of one's body. Thus, in Jewish sources, rules of good
hygiene, sleep, exercise, and diet are not just words to the wise
designed for our comfort, but commanded acts that we owe
God.' Ultimately, the duty to save one's own life and that of
others (pikkuah nefesh) supersedes all other commandments
except three.'
Just as Jews are commanded to take positive steps to
maintain good health, likewise, we are obligated to avoid dan-
ger and injury.' Indeed, Jewish law views endangering one's
health as worse than violating a ritual prohibition.6 For exam-
ple, anyone who cannot subsist except by taking charity but
refuses to do so out of pride is shedding blood and is guilty of
a mortal offense.7 Similarly, Conservative, Reform, and some
2. See, e.g., Torah, Deuteronomy 10:14; Writings, Psalms 24:1. See also Torah, Genesis
14:19, 23 (using the Hebrew word for "Creator" [koneh] which also means "Possessor" and where
"heaven and earth" is a merism for those and everything in between). Cf. Torah, Exodus 20:11;
Torah, Leviticus 25:23, 42, 55; Torah, Deuteronomy 4:35, 39; 32:6.
3. Leviticus Rabbah, 34:3 (describing Hillel's reasoning as to why bathing is a
commandment). Maimonides' codified rules requiring proper care of the body: MAIMONIDES'
MISHNEH TORAH, Laws of Ethics (De'ot), chs. 3-5.
4. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 132a; Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 85b; Babylonian
Talmud, Avodah Zarah 28b; MmMONmES' MISHNEH TORAH, Laws of the Foundations of the
Torah ch. 5:2 & 5:7; MAIMONIDES' MISHNEH TORAH, Laws of the Sabbath ch. 2; JOSEPH KARo,
SHULHAN ARUKH Orah Hayyim 328:1.
5. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 32a; Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 80a & 91b;
MAIMONIDES' MIsHNEH TORAH, Laws of Murder 11:4-5; JOSEPH KARO, SHULmAN ARUKH Yoreh
De'ah 116:5; JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARUKH Hoshen Mishpat 427:8-10.
6. Babylonian Talmud, Hullin lOa; JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARUKH Orah Hayyim 173:2;
JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARUKH Yoreh De'ah 116:5.
7. JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARUKH Yoreh De'ah 255:2.
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Orthodox authorities have prohibited smoking as an unaccept-
able risk to our God-owned bodies.8 Ultimately, human beings
do not, according to Judaism, have the right to murder some-
one else or even the right to dispose of their own bodies at will
(i.e., commit suicide). Rather, both murder and suicide would
be a total obliteration of that which does not belong to us but
rather to God.9
2. The Permission and Obligation to Heal
God's ownership of our bodies is the foundation behind
our obligation to help other people escape sickness, injury, and
death." This obligation is not for some general (and often
vague) humanitarian reason or for reasons of anticipated reci-
procity. Even the duty of physicians to heal the sick is not a
function of a special oath that they take, an obligation of reci-
procity to the society that trained them, or a contractual prom-
ise that they make in return for remuneration. Rather, a physi-
cian has his duty because all creatures of God are under the
divine imperative to help God preserve and protect what is His.
The duty to heal is neither the sole, nor an obvious, con-
clusion from the Bible. According to the Bible, God inflicts ill-
ness as a punishment for sin and since God announces Himself
as our healer," perhaps medicine is an improper human inter-
vention in God's decisions to inflict or cure illness.
The rabbis were aware of this line of reasoning, but they
countered it by pointing out that God Himself authorizes us to
heal. In fact, He requires us to heal. They found that authoriza-
8. See ELLIOT N. DORFF & ARTHUR ROSETT, A LIVING TREE: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH
OF JEWISH LAW 337-362 (1988) (discussing various Judaic authorities that prohibit smoking).
9. Torah, Genesis 9:5-6; Mishnah, Semahot 2:2; Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 91b;
Midrah Rabbah, Genesis 34:13 stating that the ban against suicide includes not only cases where
blood was shed, but also self-inflicted death through strangulation and the like; MAIMONIDES'
MISHNEH TORAH, Laws of Murder 2:3; MAIMONIDES' MISHNEH TORAH, Laws of Injury and
Damage 5:1; JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARAKH Yoreh De'ah 345:1-3. See also J. DAVID BLEICH,
JUDAISM AND HEALING: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES 158-161 (1981) (discussing Jewish teaching
with regard to suicide).
10. Sifra on Leviticus 19:16; Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 73a; MAIMONIDES' MISHNEH
TORAH, Laws of Murder 1:14; JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARuKH Hoshen Mishpat 426.
11. God inflicts illness as punishment for sin, see, e.g., Torah, Leviticus 26:16; Torah,
Deuteronomy 28:59-61. God as our healer, see, e.g., Torah, Exodus 15:26; Deuteronomy 32:39;
Prophets, Isaiah 19:22,57:18-19; Prophets, Jeremiah 30:17,33:6; Prophets, Hosea 6:1; Writings,
Psalms 103:2-3, 107:20; Writings, Job 5:18.
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tion and imperative in two Biblical verses. First, Exodus 21:19-
20, which states that if one assaults another he must provide
for his victim until he i§ "thoroughly healed," presumably by
paying for his medical care. The second duty to heal is found
in Deuteronomy 22:2 which states "you shall restore the lost
property to him." The Talmud understands the Exodus verse as
giving permission for the physician to cure, whether hired by
an assailant, as in the Bible's case, or not. On the basis of an
extra letter in the Hebrew text of the Deuteronomy passage, the
Talmud declares that this verse includes the obligation to re-
store another person's body as well as his property. Hence,
there is an obligation to come to the aid of someone else in a
life-threatening situation. On the basis of Leviticus 19:16
which states, "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your
fellow," the Talmud expands the obligation to provide medical
aid to encompass expenditure of financial resources for this
purpose. Finally, Nahmanides, a fourteenth century rabbi, un-
derstands the obligation to care for others through medicine as
one of many applications of the Torah's principle, "And you
shall love your neighbor as yourself' (Leviticus 19:18).12
While each Jew must come to the aid of a person in dis-
tress, and while the assailant has the direct duty to cure his
victim, Jewish law recognizes the expertise involved in proper
medical care. Thus, as in other similar cases, the layman may
hire the expert to carry out his obligations. The Talmud reflects
some ambivalence about the level of expertise of physicians of
its time (most explicitly in comments like "The best of physi-
cians deserves to go to Hell!"). 3 Furthermore, some later
Jewish authorities were particularly wary of physicians' abili-
ties to practice internal medicine (as contrasted with surgery
and healing external wounds and diseases). However, in the
end, the Talmud prohibits Jews from living in a community
12. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 85a, 81b; Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 73a, 84b.
See also Sifrei Deuteronomy on Deuteronomy 22:2; Leviticus Rabbah 34:3 (explaining that the
soul is a guest in the body and a man who bestows kindness on his body does good to his soul);
NAHMANIDES, KITVEI HA-RAMBAN [WRITINGS OF NAHMANIDES] 2:43 (Bernard Chavel, ed.,
Mosad Harav Kook 1963 [Hebrew]). This passage comes from NAHMANIDES' TORAT HA-ADAM
[THE INSTRUCrION OF MAN], Sh'ar Sakkanah (Section on Danger) discussing Babylonian
Talmud, Bava Kamma, ch. 8; JOSEPH KARo, BET YOSEF on the Tur, Yoreh De'ah 336.
Nahmanides bases himself on similar reasoning in Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 84b.
13. Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 82a.
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where no physician is present. This conclusion returns us to the
first principle described above: for only if a physician is avail-
able can one carry out one's duty to preserve that part of
God's property which is our bodies. 4
The expert, in turn, has special obligations because of his
expertise. Thus, Rabbi Joseph Karo (1488-1575), the author of
one of the most important Jewish codes, states the following:
The Torah gave permission to the physician to heal; moreover,
this is a religious precept and is included in the category of
saving life, and if the physician withholds his services, it is
considered as shedding blood."
Similarly, the following rabbinic story indicates that the
rabbis recognized the theological issue involved in medical
care. Furthermore, it also indicates the clear assertion of the
Jewish tradition that the physician's work is legitimate and, in
fact, obligatory:
It once happened that Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva were
strolling in the streets of Jerusalem accompanied by another
person. They were met by a sick person. He said to them, 'My
masters, tell me by what means I may be cured.' They told him,
'Do thus and so until you are cured.' The sick man asked them,
'And who afflicted me?' They replied, 'The Holy One, blessed
be He.' The sick man responded, 'You have entered into a
matter which does not pertain to you. God has afflicted, and
you seek to cure! Are you not transgressing His will?'
Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael asked him, 'What is your occu-
pation?' The sick man answered, 'I am a tiller of the soil, and
here is the sickle in my hand.' They asked him, 'Who created
the vineyard?' 'The Holy One, blessed be He,' he answered.
Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael said to him, 'You enter into a
matter which does not pertain to you! God created the vineyard,
14. Abraham ibn Ezra, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Jonathan Eybescheutz all restricted the
physician's mandate to external injuries: See Ibn Ezra's commentary on Exodus 21:19 and cf. his
comments on Exodus 15:26 and Exodus 23:25, and see also where he cites Job 5:18 and I
Chronicles 16:12-13 in support of his view; Bahya's commentary on Exodus 21:19; JONATHAN
EYBESCHEUTz, KERETI U'PLEl (analyzing JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARAKH Yoreh De'ah 188:5).
See IMMANUEL JAKOBOvITS, JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS 5-6 (1959, 1972) (discussing historical
views on medicine and stating that Jewish practice teaches people to seek out doctors). Jerusalem
Talmud, J. Kiddushin 66d (stating that a Jew may not live in a city without a physician). Cf
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 17b, where this requirement is applied only to "the students of the
Sages."
15. JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARUKH Yoreh De'ah 336:1.
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and you cut fruits from it.'
He said to them, 'Do you not see the sickle in my hand? If I
did not plow, sow, fertilize, and weed, nothing would sprout.'
Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael said to him, 'Foolish man! ...
Just as if one does not weed, fertilize, and plow, the trees will
not produce fruit, and if fruit is produced but is not watered or
fertilized, it will not live but die, so with regard to the body.
Drugs and medicaments are the fertilizer, and the physician is
the tiller of the soil.'
1 6
This is a remarkable concept, for it declares that God does not
bring about all healing or creativity on His own, but rather
depends upon human beings to aid in the process. Thus, God
commands us to try. We are, in the Talmudic phrase, God's
partners in the ongoing act of creation. 7
3. Implications for genetic screening
In the case of genetic screening, the permission and obli-
gation to heal means several things. First, a child born with a
genetic disease is God's creation just as much as any "normal"
human being is. Therefore, we clearly do not have the right to
take that child's life. Quite the contrary, we have the duty to
provide for the special needs of the child and later the adult, to
make him or her as much a part of society as possible, and
even to bless God for creating His human creatures to be dif-
ferent from one another.'"
Second, we have not only the right, but the obligation, to
do our best to cure the disease, and, failing that, to ameliorate
its effects. In other words, however much support there is in
16. See OT7AR MIDRASHIm 2:580-581 (J.D. Eisenstein ed. 1915) (citing Midrash
Temurrah). Cf. Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 40b. This is a story in which Rabbi [Yehudah,
the President of the Sanhedrin] expresses appreciation for foods that can cure. Although
circumcision is not justified in the Jewish tradition in medical terms, it is instructive that the
Rabbis maintained that Jewish boys were not born circumcised specifically because God created
the world such that it would need human fixing. A similar idea is articulated here on behalf a of
physicians' activity despite God's rule. See also Midrash Rabbah, Genesis 11:6; Pesikta Rabbati
22:4.
17. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 10a, 119b. Cf Torah, Genesis 2:1-3 (participating in
God's ongoing act of creation when reciting this passage on the Sabbath); Babylonian Talmud,
Sanhedrin 38a (wanting the Sadducees not to be able to say that angels or any being other than
humans participate with God in creation).
18. See generally CARL ASTOR, . . . WHO MAKES PEOPLE DIFFERENT: JEWISH
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DISABLED (Stephen Garfinkel ed. 1985).
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the tradition to see sickness as the consequence of sin, that
theological perspective, which itself is strongly challenged as
early as the biblical Book of Job, in any case does not limit
our attempts to find and give cure and comfort. Thus, in accor-
dance with Judaism's usual rules governing dying, we may
withhold or withdraw life support mechanisms if they are not
effective in curing a fatal disease, and we must do everything
we can to make the sufferer comfortable. 9 In the meantime,
we must seek to develop means to prevent or cure the disease.
Third, while few would doubt the Jewish legitimacy of
seeking to cure disease through genetic engineering, at some
point our efforts in that direction may come into conflict with
the principle of God's creative prerogative and God's owner-
ship of our bodies. When the conflict occurs will depend upon
how broadly "disease" is defined. For example, should we, if
we can, change genes for height or intelligence to "cure" unde-
sirable results and "improve" the species? The very possibility
of using genetic engineering in that way has immediate impli-
cations for the treatment and even the conception of the value
of the disabled in our society. Additionally, it also effects those
who are considered "normal" now, but who would not be
deemed so under some formula for genetic eugenics. Theologi-
cally, the dilemma is to define when we cease legitimately to
be God's partners in creation and become instead God's substi-
tute, "playing God," as it were, in changing the nature of the
species. While that line of questioning will be critical in years
to come, I will only note it here and not treat it. Rather, I take
19. Two long rabbinic rulings were passed by the Conservative Movement's Committee on
Jewish Law and Standards on the process of dying. See Elliot N. Dorff, A Jewish Approach to
End-Stage Medical Care, CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM, Spring 1991, at 3-51; Avram Israel Reisner, A
Halakhic Ethic of Care for the Terminally Ill, CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM, Spring 1991, at 52-89
(permitting withdrawal of machines and medications, but not artificial nutrition and hydration). I
permit the withdrawal or withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration as well. In a subsequent
ruling, however, Rabbi Reisner agreed that in the case of neonates born prematurely, even
artificial nutrition and hydration may be withheld or removed.
My ruling would permit administering as much pain medication as necessary to make the
child feel comfortable, even if, in the last stages of life, the amount of morphine required to
alleviate the child's pain is also the amount which will hasten his or her death. Intent is the critical
factor here: we may not do anything with the intent of bringing about the child's death more
speedily, but we may and should do whatever is necessary to make the child feel comfortable,
even if that has the secondary effect of advancing the child's death. Rabbi Reisner, however, does
not accept the double-effect argument, and so for him morphine may be used only to the extent
that it will not shorten the patient's life.
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refuge that the condition caused by the BRCA1 gene mutation
is, on all accounts, a disease and that genetic engineering to
cure it is not currently possible. I therefore focus on genetic
screening for the BRCA1 mutation and the responses to it that
are now available.
B. The Status of Abortion in Jewish Law
If a couple elects to test for the BRCA1 gene mutation or
for any other genetic disease, and if repeated tests are positive,
the couple currently has two options. They can, first, let the
fetus go to term and then deal with the consequences of the
disease, whether that be raising the child while all involved
endure the effects of the disease, or, if the illness is fatal, mak-
ing the afflicted child as comfortable as possible during the
dying process. A couple's second alternative is to abort. It is
thus important to review Jewish sources on abortion in formu-
lating a Jewish response to the couple's dilemma.
The Jewish tradition has a clear bias for life. Indeed, life
is considered sacred. Consequently, although abortion is per-
mitted in some circumstances and actually required in others,
in most cases Jewish law forbids abortion. The decision to
abort is certainly not viewed as a morally neutral matter of
individual desire or as an acceptable form of post facto birth
control.
On the other hand, Judaism does not see abortion as mur-
der, as Catholicism does, because biblical and rabbinic sources
understand the process of gestation developmentally. The fertil-
ized egg cell and the later-term fetus are potential life and,
therefore, may not be destroyed without reason, but they do not
have the same legal status as a person after birth.
This view of the fetus begins with the biblical law that if
a pregnant woman miscarries as a result of being struck by two
men fighting, the one who hit her is not guilty of murder and
therefore subject to the death penalty, but rather of assault and
therefore subject to monetary compensation and fines for the
injury. 0 This indicates that, according to the Bible, the fetus
does not constitute a full-fledged human being with all of the
20. Torah, Exodus 21:22-25.
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protections attaining to that status. (Note that Christian inter-
pretations of that passage depend on the Septuagint translation
of the Hebrew Bible, which, in this case, is erroneous or at
best misleading.)
Following this biblical lead, the Talmud distinguishes two
stages in pregnancy, but in both, the status of the fetus does
not rise to that of a human being, which comes only with birth.
Specifically, the Talmud rules that within the first forty days
after conception the zygote is "simply water."' Another Tal-
mudic source distinguishes the first trimester from the re-
mainder of gestation.22 From one or the other of those points
in the gestational process to the moment of birth, the fetus is,
according to rabbinic sources, "like the thigh of its mother."'
These marking points are not based on a theory of
ensoulment at a particular moment in the uterus; the physical
development of the fetus determines them. The effect of these
demarcations is to make abortion during the early periods
permitted for more reasons than during the rest of pregnancy
while making abortion generally prohibited.
Specifically, because the body belongs to God, no man or
woman may decide one day to cut off his or her thigh on a
whim. That would be to destroy that which does not belong to
you. Similarly, since the fetus is "like the thigh of its mother,"
one may not abort simply as a matter of choice. Indeed, abor-
tion is generally prohibited.24
On the other hand, if the thigh is gangrenous, the person
not only may, but must, have the thigh amputated in order to
save his or her life. Similarly, if the fetus a woman is carrying
threatens her life or health, then even if she deeply wants to
have the child, she must have it aborted.' This is because the
21. Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 69b. Cf. Mishnah, Niddah 3:7 (30b); JAKOBOVITS, supra
note 14, at 275 (noting that "forty days" in Talmudic terms may mean just under two months in
our modem way of calculating gestation due to improved methods of determining the date of
conception).
22. Babylonian Talmud, Niddah 17a.
23. Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 58a. See also Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 23b which states
"the fetus is regarded as one of her limbs."
24. See DAVID M. FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL IN JEWISH LAW 265-66, 268-94 (1968)
(explaining why abortion is generally prohibited by Jewish law).
25. See JAKOBOVITs, supra note 14, at 186-87,378-79 n.173 (concluding that the life of the
fetus must be set aside to save the life of the mother).
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fetus does not attain the full rights and protections of a human
being until birth - specifically when the forehead emerges or,
if it is a breech birth, when most of the body emerges.26 The
mother, of course, has full human status. Consequently, if the
fetus threatens the mother's life or health, it must be aborted.
The following Mishnah graphically stipulates this premise:
If a woman has (life-threatening) difficulty in childbirth, one
dismembers the embryo in her, limb by limb, because her life
takes precedence over its life. Once its head (or its "greater
part") has emerged, it may not be touched, for we do not set
aside one life for another'
Only in a narrow band of cases does the woman have a
choice in the matter. This choice occurs if the fetus does not
clearly and directly endanger her life and health but does in-
crease her risks beyond those of normal pregnancy. Under such
circumstances, the woman, in consultation with her physician,
may abort, but she may also choose to accept the elevated risks
and carry to term. It is not surprising that authorities differ
widely on how much of a threat to a woman's health the fetus
must pose to justify or require an abortion.
Based on a responsum by Rabbi Israel Meir Mizrahi in the
late seventeenth century,' many modem authorities also per-
mit an abortion to preserve the mother's mental health. This
premise has been variously construed in narrow or lenient
terms in modem times.29 To the extent that Jewish law makes
a special provision for an unusually young or old mother, an
unmarried mother, the victim of a rape, or the participant in an
adulterous or incestuous union, abortion is usually justified as a
measure necessary to preserve the mother's mental health. 0
26. Mishnah, Niddah 3:5.
27. Mishnah, Oholot 7:6. There are variant versions of this. See, e.g., Jerusalem Talmud,
Shabbat 14:4 (stating that a neonate may not be touched when "its greater part has emerged"); T.
Yevamot 9:9 and Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 72b (stating "its head"); Jerusalem Talmud,
Sanhedrin 8 (stating "its head or its greater part"). The later codes follow suit MAIMONIDES'
MISHNEH TORAH, Laws of Murder and Protection of Life 1:1; JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARUKH
Hoshen Mishpat 425:2.
28. ISRAEL MEIR MizRAhI, RESPONSA P~i HA-ARETz (1899) (commenting in Volume III,
number 2 on the Yoreh De'ah).
29. See FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 284-94 (describing different situations for which
permission to abort is granted). MOSHE HALEvi SPERO, JUDAISM AND PSYCHOLOGY: HALAKHIC
PERSPECTIVES 168-80 (1980) (discussing abortion rationales).
30. See FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 284-94; SPERO, supra note 29, at 173; JAKOBOVITS,
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Mental health reasons for an abortion are not, however, con-
strued so broadly in contemporary rabbinic opinions as to
condone an abortion for economic reasons, or because the cou-
ple wanted a child of a specific gender and the fetus is of the
opposite gender, or simply because the woman did not want to
bear a child.
There is no justification in the traditional sources for
aborting a fetus for reasons having to do with the health of the
fetus; only the mother's health is a consideration. As a result,
some people object to performing an amniocentesis at all for
fear that the information which is gained through such a proce-
dure may tempt those involved to abort." Supporters of am-
niocentesis argue the opposite premise; where it is clear that
the mother is not able to cope with the prospect of bearing or
raising a child afflicted with a given genetic disease, they
justify aborting the fetus on the basis of preserving the
mother's mental health. Supporters consequently permit the
prenatal diagnostic procedure to determine whether the fetus
has the disease in the first place, especially when the mother or
father for any reason falls within a group particularly at risk
for begetting such a child.3"
Many Conservative and Reform rabbis, and even a few
contemporary Orthodox rabbis, approach the matter in a com-
pletely different way. They reason that traditional sources
recognize only threats to the mother's health as grounds for
abortion because until recently it was impossible to know any-
thing about the genetic or medical make-up of the fetus before
birth. Our new medical knowledge, they say, should establish
the fetus' health as an independent consideration.33
supra note 14, at 189-90 (concluding that abortion is justified for moral or other grave reasons).
31. See, e.g., J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 112-15 (1977)
(discussing various Judaic views of abortion); J. David Bleich, Abortion in Halakhic Literature, in
JEWISH BIOETHICS 134, 175 n.97 (Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979) (analyzing Halakhic
literature which discusses abortion).
32. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 284-94 (describing when abortion is
permitted under Jewish law).
33. See generally ALEX J. GOLDMAN, JUDAISM CONFRONTS CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 35-62
(1978) (summarizing positions within all three movements).
The Conservative Movement's Committee on Jewish Law and Standards has adopted an
official position stating that "[A]bortion is justifiable if a continuation of pregnancy might cause
the mother severe physical of psychological damage, or if the fetus is judged by competent
medical opinion to be severely defective." See Ben Zion Bokser & Kassel Abelson, Statement on
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Although I personally agree with this approach, there are
problems with it. Aside from the fact that it would represent an
innovation in Jewish law, it raises the extremely difficult issue
of determining what constitutes a sufficient defect which war-
rants abortion. The "easy" cases are those in which the fetus
has minimal neurological function, as in cases of anencephaly,
or a terminal, degenerative disease like Tay-Sachs. The more
difficult cases involve diseases such as Huntington's Chorea in
which the degeneration does not begin until age thirty-five or
forty. I believe that abortion is not justified in the case of
Huntington's Chorea since the person will live an extended
period of time without suffering from the disease's debilitating
effects. Furthermore, there is reasonable hope that the person
may have children of his or her own and that a cure may be
developed in that time. But, where do we draw the line? Is it
appropriate at a life expectancy of twenty-five years? Fifteen
years? Ten years? What constitutes a defect which justifies
abortion in the first place? Mental retardation? If so, how
much? Blindness or deafness? Answers to these questions pose
the risk of dehumanizing people with disabilities and defining
qualifications for a master race.
The difficulty of making these decisions does not mean
that we can or should shrink from them. Human life requires
decisions throughout, and the essence of morality is not only
the will to do the right and the good, but additionally the abili-
ty to recognize them. The latter requires one to develop the
sensitivity to analyze the moral issues in specific cases and to
the Permissibility of Abortion, 37 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITrEE ON JEWISH LAW AND
STANDARDS OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 1980-85, at 37 (1988). See also id. at 3-35
(providing the rabbinic opinions of Rabbis Kassel Abelson, David M. Feldman, Robert Gordis
and Issac Klein which justify this joint position).
Orthodox rabbis who take this position: ELIEZER WALDENBERG, RESPONSA Tzrlz
ELIEzER 9:51 (1967); ELIEZER WALDENBERG, RESPONSA TZIT ELIEZER 13:102 (1978); SAUL
ISRAELI, AMUD HAYEMINI, no. 35 cited in NO'AM 16 (K.H.) 27 (note); L. GROSSNASS, RESPONSA
LEV ARYEH 2:205.
For the Reform position, refer to WALTER JACOB, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN REFORM
RESPONSA 23-27 (1987) [hereinafter JACOB, CONTEMPORARY RESPONSA]. Here, Jacob states that
"[wie do not encourage abortion, nor favor it for trivial reasons, or sanction it 'on demand,"' but
he would sanction it for the physical or psychological health of the mother (including cases of
incest and rape, if the mother wishes it). Moreover, "[s]uch problems, as those caused by Tay-
Sachs and other degenerative or permanent conditions which seriously endanger the life of the




distinguish among them in determining their moral valence.
Unlike Christian Science, Judaism has taken the stand that one
does not need to accept whatever nature serves us. Rather, one
has the right, and indeed the duty, to intervene medically as an
agent or partner of God. The advances of modem medical
science have created a whole new spectrum of decisions that
we may prefer not to make, but there is no escaping our duty
to confront these issues as responsibly as we can.
With regard to abortion, in some cases an abortion will be
clearly justifiable or clearly unjustifiable according to the cri-
teria established by Jewish law. In other cases, the matter will
be more clouded. In the latter group the traditional method of
judging the issue on the basis of the mother's mental reaction
to the defect may be the wisest choice. For some mothers,
raising a mentally retarded child is manageable and possibly
even fulfilling. However, for others, it is beyond their psycho-
logical competence to handle.
This of course means that only the people who are psy-
chologically the strongest and the most stable would have the
responsibility to raise such children. That is unfair. Moreover,
if most families abort "defective" children, one wonders about
the degree to which society, in the long run, will tolerate im-
perfections and provide for people who have them. Thus, the
very sensitivity of society to the sanctity of life is at stake.
Even so, these decisions must be made, and rabbis are
gradually developing a series of precedents which will ulti-
mately provide guidelines for making them. In addition, medi-
cal, religious, and mental health professionals must be trained
to help families facing these excruciating decisions.
In practice much of this discussion is moot. Jews engage
in abortion almost indiscriminately. Indeed, before the law in
Israel was changed recently to make abortion less readily avail-
able, there were some years when there were more abortions
than live births among Jews. American Jews are no less apt to
abort. That is a particularly problematic phenomenon for the
contemporary Jewish community because Jews are barely re-
producing themselves in Israel. Likewise, they are falling far
short of reproduction in North America. The Jewish reproduc-
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tive rate is approximately 1.6 or 1.7 children per couple.34
Consequently, even those rabbis who are liberal in their inter-
pretation of Jewish abortion law are also calling for Jews to
marry and to have three or four children so that the Jewish
people and Judaism can continue for more than another genera-
tion or two.
35
This is just one instance of a larger phenomenon - name-
ly, the relationship of Jews to Jewish law. According to the
1990 Jewish Population Study conducted by the Council of
Jewish Federations, 6.6% of those born Jewish see themselves
as Orthodox, 37.8% Conservative, and 42.4% Reform. The
remaining 13.2% see their Jewish connection in a variety of
different ways. 6 Orthodox Jews, at least in theory, see
themselves as bound to Jewish law. Conservative Jews do too,
but they understand Jewish law historically and therefore are
more apt to change it. Members of both movements who are
committed to their ideologies would be likely to take the legal
duties and limitations described above seriously. Reform Jews
have adopted Enlightenment notions of personal autonomy in
their understanding of what Judaism should be today. As a
result, American Reform Jews, in living out their movement's
ideology, and, in practice, many American Orthodox and Con-
servative Jews, influenced by the heavy American emphasis on
individual liberty, would all undoubtedly understand the legal
duties and limitations delineated above as the lessons of their
tradition which they then need to evaluate on their own in
deciding what they themselves will do.3
34. BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., COUNCIL OF JEWISH FOUNDATIONS, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE
CJF 1990 NATIONAL JEWISH POPULATION SURVEY 15 (1991) (charting the number of children
born per woman by age and Jewish identity). I am rounding out the figures presented there for the
various age groups. The most important (and the most threatening) statistics are those for women
now in their child-bearing years: 0.12 for women between 18 and 24 years of age, 0.87 for women
between 25 and 34, and 1.57 for women between 35 and 44. Compare these figures with that of
the general, white population in the United States: 0.35, 1.29, and 2.00, respectively. See id.
35. This was the clear and repeated message in the rabbinic letter which I wrote for and
with the Rabbinical Assembly's Commission on Human Sexuality. That letter, after extensive
discussion and revision, was approved and published by the Rabbinical Assembly as a whole, and
it thus represents the opinion of the Conservative rabbinate. See generally ELLIOT N. DoRFF,
"THIs Is MY BELOVED, THIS Is MY FRIEND:" A RABBINIC LETTER ON INTIMATE RELATIONS
(1996). On this issue, the Orthodox would undoubtedly agree, and most of the Reform rabbinate
would as well.
36. See KOSMIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 32 (charting the denominational preferences of
adult Jews by religion).
37. For a description and explanation of the ideologies of American Jewish movements and
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C. Genetic Screening for Tay-Sachs
Many of the rabbinic opinions written to date that have
been analogous to our case of the BRCA1 mutation concern
genetic screening for Tay-Sachs Disease. Using these prece-
dents for the BRCA1 case will require both an evaluation of
their soundness with regard to Tay-Sachs itself, and then an
analysis of the similarities and differences between Tay-Sachs
and BRCA1. It will thus be helpful to review the nature of
Tay-Sachs and the precedents with regard to screening.
Tay-Sachs is a genetic disease which causes deterioration
five or six months after birth and death by the third or fourth
year of life. While approximately one in three hundred of the
general population is a carrier, among Ashkenazic Jews (that
is, those descended from Jews living in Central and Eastern
Europe) it is one in thirty, that is, ten times as frequent. Since
both parents must have the disease for their child to have it,
statistically one in nine hundred Jewish couples may have a
Tay-Sachs child. For those couples, who are themselves normal
physically and mentally, each time they conceive a child they
have a twenty-five percent chance of bearing a child with the
disease, a fifty percent chance of producing a normal child
who is a carrier, and a twenty-five percent chance of producing
a child who is completely free of the disease. The statistical
probability among Ashkenazic Jews of bearing a child afflicted
with Tay-Sachs is one in 3600. Those who inherit the Tay-
Sachs mutation from both parents have virtually a one-hun-
dred-percent chance of suffering and ultimately dying from the
disease.
For purposes of comparison, the carrier frequency of Tay-
Sachs among Ashkenazim is three to four percent, Gaucher's
Disease is four to six percent, Canavan 1.7 to two percent, and
Niemann-Pick one to two percent. The reported carrier frequen-
cy among Ashkenazic women of the BRCAI mutation con-
nected with breast and ovarian cancer, the subject of this Arti-
cle, is approximately one percent." While Tay-Sachs and the
their implications for Jewish law, refer to ELLIOT N. DORFF, CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM: OUR
ANCESTORS To OUR DESCENDANTS 110-57 (1977); ELLIOT N. DORFF, CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM:
OUR ANCESTORS To OUR DESCENDANTS 96-149 (1996).
38. See Jeffrey P. Struewing et al., The Carrier Frequency of the BRCAI 185delAG
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other diseases mentioned are all carried on recessive genes,
BRCA1 is carried on the dominant gene. Therefore, while the
other diseases can only infect those who inherit the particular
recessive gene from both parents, only one parent needs to
pass on the BRCA1 gene for the child to be affected by it.
Assuming that approximately half of the children born are
female and one percent of all children born to Ashkenazic
women have the BRCA1 mutation, half that percentage, or one
of every two hundred children, born to Ashkenazic women
will, as a result of this gene, be at substantial risk for breast
cancer. (It may also be true that male children born with this
gene have an increased risk for prostate or colon cancers, but
the available data, as far as I know, does not show nearly as
strong a linkage between the presence of the gene and these
forms of cancer in males.) Keep this higher frequency in mind
as I review the concerns with the less frequent Tay-Sachs
disease and seek to apply them appropriately to BRCA1.
Screening for Tay-Sachs, which has become common
among Ashkenazic Jews, will in the vast majority of cases
indicate that neither partner is a carrier. Therefore, in those
situations, nothing should be done. In those cases where only
one of the partners is a carrier, there are no implications for
the reproductive plans for the couple themselves, but their
children and their respective spouses need to be tested when
they are thinking of having children. If both partners are carri-
ers, the usual procedure followed by physicians and genetics
counselors is to warn the couple of the one-in-four risks of
bearing a Tay-Sachs child, counsel them about the alternatives
to having their own children (including adoption and now the
use of donor gametes), and admonish them that if they do
proceed to have their own children, they should have the cells
of the fetus tested.
This regimen poses two sorts of problems which must be
addressed: (1) the advice given the couple to consider not
having children of their own; and (2) the abortion following a
diagnosis of Tay-Sachs. Rabbi J. David Bleich has been most
forceful in opposing the usual regimen on these grounds. He





The obligation with regard to procreation is not suspended
simply because of the statistical probability that some children
of the union may be deformed or abnormal. While the couple
may quite properly be counseled with regard to the risks of
having a Tay-Sachs child, it should be stressed that failure to
bear natural children is not a halakhically viable alternative. As
has been indicated earlier, artificial insemination using donor
semen is not an acceptable solution.39
"Of at least equal, if not graver concern," he writes, "is the
possibility that the couple will abort the child if it proves to
have Tay-Sachs. The fear that a child may be born physically
malformed or mentally deficient does not in itself justify re-
course to abortion."'  He is especially concerned with this
alternative because if amniocentesis is used to determine the
Tay-Sachs status of the child, that procedure is normally per-
formed in the sixteenth week of gestation. Therefore, any abor-
tion performed in response to the information learned from the
amniocentesis is commonly done in the eighteenth week of
pregnancy. The eighteenth week of pregnancy is long past the
stage when the child is "simply water." By hypothesis, no risk
to the mother is involved, and therefore such an abortion
would not be legitimate in Bleich's view. Bleich would, there-
fore, restrict the use of amniocentesis to cases where there is a
medical remedy for the disease. The amniocentesis would
indicate as, for example, a blood-group incompatibility which
can be treated by exchange transfusion. Where there is no
therapeutic option aside from abortion, amniocentesis should
not, in his opinion, be performed in the first place because it
would tempt those involved to perform an illegitimate abortion.
Furthermore, it "poses a pointless medical risk to both the
mother and the fetus and also constitutes an act of chavalah -
an unwarranted assault upon the mother."'" (Presumably, if
chorionic villus sampling is used to test the fetal genetic struc-
ture, since that is usually done in approximately the sixth week
of gestation, this concern would be less weighty for Rabbi
39. BLEICH, supra note 9, at 105.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 106.
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Bleich, but I frankly doubt that he would permit the abortion
even then, given that the mother's life or health is not endan-
gered.)
On the other hand, Rabbi Bleich does countenance screen-
ing for Tay-Sachs through blood tests before marriage, prefera-
bly in the teenage years. He notes that a person found to be a
carrier may suffer anxiety and depression as a result and that
others may see such a person as a pariah, but both reactions
would be unfounded and contrary to Jewish law. The Jewish
community, in fact, would be duty-bound in such cases to
make sure that carriers are not stigmatized that way.
Carriers should, though, try to marry people who are not
themselves carriers to avoid any possibility of producing a
child with the disease. This is in conformity with "what is
historically perhaps the oldest recorded item of genetic coun-
seling," namely, that the Talmud advises a man not to marry
into a family where leprosy or epilepsy has appeared in at least
three people.42 A person who is not a carrier need not fear
marrying a carrier, as long as their children are also tested and
counseled. It must be emphasized, however, Rabbi Bleich says,
that "when Tay-Sachs screening is carried out before marriage
and both prospective bride and groom have been identified as
Tay-Sachs carriers they must be counseled that Judaism does
not sanction a sterile union."43
Other rabbis who have written on this issue share Rabbi
Bleich's concern with the duty to procreate, but permit some of
the procedures which he prohibits. Specifically, as noted above,
Conservative, Reform, and some Orthodox rabbis would permit
an abortion when the fetus suffers from an untreatable genetic
disease. Such rabbis, therefore, would certainly permit, and
maybe even advise, prenatal testing to determine whether the
fetus has such a disease. Given the risks of amniocentesis
itself, the procedure should only be done when the child is in
special "at-risk" categories. Thus, if both parents are carriers of
Tay-Sachs, that certainly qualifies. If the results indicate that
the child will be a carrier but will not have the disease, the
child certainly should not be aborted. However, if the child
42. Babylonian Talmud, Yevanot 64b.
43. BLEICH, supra note 9, at 106.
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will suffer from the disease, most rabbis would allow an abor-
tion.
Even those rabbis who take this stance would agree with
Rabbi Bleich that genetic screening for Tay-Sachs should be
done in the teenage years. The same holds true for the other
diseases mentioned above which effect Jews in disproportionate
numbers. People informed of their carrier or non-carrier status
would probably not make marital decisions on that basis, and
their refusal to do that is appropriate. If both are carriers for
any of these diseases, however, they should use prenatal testing
to determine whether their fetus has the disease so that they
can determine whether they want to abort. In such cases, the
abortion would be justified as a measure to preserve the
mother's mental health or, in the alternative theory in contem-
porary Jewish legal rulings, as a direct result of the child's
disease.
The couple in which both people are carriers for one of
these diseases may, however, engage in other approaches as
well. According to my own rabbinic ruling, which was ap-
proved by the Conservative Movement's Committee on Jewish
Law and Standards, the couple may, with some restrictions, use
donor semen or eggs as a way of avoiding the possibility that
the child will suffer from the disease. That alternative would
make an abortion unnecessary. The couple also has the option
of adoption.
Even though procreation requires the contributions of both
male and female genetic materials, for both exegetical and
economic reasons, Jewish law interprets the commandment to
procreate to devolve upon the man.' Thus if donor sperm or
44. Both the Mishnah and the Talmud have difficulty finding a biblical verse to support the
ruling. See Mishnah, Yevamot 6:6 (61b), where the ruling is recorded as the majority opinion (that
is, without ascription) but without textual support. See also where Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka
immediately objects: "With regard to both of them [i.e., the male and female God first created] the
Torah says, "And God blessed them and said to them... 'Be fruitful and multiply."' (Torah,
Genesis 1:28). But see Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 65b-66a (bringing conflicting evidence as to
whether a woman is legally responsible for procreation and ultimately does not decide the matter).
Cf. MAIMONIDES' MISHNEH TORAH, Laws of Marriage 15:2; JOSEPH KARO, SHULHAN ARUKH
Even Haezer 1:1, 13.
The Talmud there also brings conflicting exegetical grounds for the Mishnah's ruling,
basing it alternatively on "Replenish the earth and subdue it" (Torah, Genesis 1:28) or "I am God
Almighty, be fruitful and multiply" (Torah, Genesis 35:11). There are problems in using both
texts, however. The traditional pronunciation of the first is in the plural, making propagation a
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adoption is used, the man will technically not fulfill the com-
mandment of procreation. Even so, because of the documented
threat of disease in his offspring, the Conservative Movement
would see the man as if he were infertile and therefore incapa-
ble of fulfilling the commandment. Thus he is not at fault for
failing to procreate. That is, while the Conservative Movement
would certainly assert that disabled or diseased people are as
much God's creation as anyone else, it would not say, as Rabbi
Bleich does, that a couple who is at substantial risk for bring-
ing a diseased child into the world must nevertheless procreate.
Moreover, if a child is born through donor gametes or is adopt-
ed, Conservative rabbis would, according to my ruling, recog-
nize the parents who raise the child as the child's "real" par-
ents in the many and important ways that they function as
such.45
D. Applying These Principles and Precedents to BRCA1
1. Present and Future Research on BRCA1
We are now prepared to deal with the case at hand. It is
estimated that ten percent of the women diagnosed each year
with breast cancer have a family history of the disease. Like-
wise, BRCA1 mutations are estimated to account for about half
of inherited breast cancer and over three-quarters of the cases
commandment for both the man and the woman. It is only the written form of the text which is in
the masculine singular (and even that can apply, according to the rules of Hebrew grammar, to
either men alone or to both men and women). The second text is indeed in the masculine singular,
but that may be only because God is there talking to Jacob. The fact that Jacob is subject to the
commandment proves nothing in regard to whether his wives were. These problems prove that the
real reason for limiting the commandment of procreation to men is not exegetical at all, and we
have to look elsewhere for what motivated the rabbis to limit it in that way.
The real reason may have been economic: since a man was legally responsible to support
his children, it was against his financial interests to have them in the first place, and so the law had
to command him to do so. Alternatively, since the man has to offer to have conjugal relations with
his wife for procreation to take place, it may be that anatomical factor which prompted the rabbis
to impose the commandment on men. Conversely, some argue that the rabbis would not have
imposed the commandment on a woman since they would not have legally obligated her to
undertake the risks of pregnancy and childbirth, risks which were considerably greater in times
past than they are now. Whatever the reason, Jewish law ultimately places legal responsibility for
procreation on the man.
45. See Elliot N. Dorff, Artificial Insemination, Egg Donation, and Adoption, CONSERVATIVE
JUDAISM, Fall 1996, at 3-61 (discussing why parents who raise the child are deemed to be the
child's parents in some respects but not others). See specifically id. at 23-30, 50-54.
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of inherited breast and ovarian cancer combined. Samples
originally taken to test for cystic fibrosis and Tay-Sachs in 858
Ashkenazic-Jewish women in the United States and Israel
revealed that the carrier frequency among them of the
185delAG mutation alone is approximately one percent. It is
estimated that among Ashkenazi women, the BRCA1 mutation
accounts for sixteen percent of breast cancers and thirty-nine
percent of ovarian cancers diagnosed before age fifty. By con-
trast, in the non-Ashkenazi population, the estimated contribu-
tion of all BRCA1 mutations is 4.1% of breast cancer cases
(approximately a fourth the rate of Ashkenazi-Jewish women
for the 185delAG mutation alone) and twelve percent of ovari-
an cancer cases (less than a third the rate of Ashkenazi-Jewish
women for that one mutation). In families with a history of
breast or ovarian cancer, the female inheritors of BRCA1 mu-
tations have an eighty to ninety percent lifetime risk of breast
cancer and a forty to fifty percent risk of ovarian cancer. This
finding of the link between this mutation and cancer is espe-
cially important to Ashkenazi Jews.' While the results are not
as pronounced, the researchers also note that males with
BRCA1 mutations show an increased risk of contracting pros-
trate and colon cancer.47
What should be done with these results? The researchers
note that, on the one hand, "the observed 0.9% prevalence of
the 185delAG mutation is higher than the prevalence of many
genetic diseases for which routine screening is conducted."
They do not as yet recommend widespread genetic screening,
however, because it is not clear that people being tested for
being carriers of Tay-Sachs and cystic fibrosis are representa-
tive of all Ashkenazi Jews. Therefore, more random testing of
that population is necessary to determine whether all Ashkenazi
Jews are part of the at-risk population identified in this study,
or only a subset of them, namely, those at risk for Tay-Sachs
or cystic fibrosis. This further research should, in their view,
also collect personal and family histories of cancer to deter-
46. See Strmewing et al., supra note 38, at 198.
47. See Deborah Ford, et al., Risks of Cancer in BRCAI-Mutation Carriers, 343 LANCEr
692, 694 (1994) (stating that BRCAI carriers also experience moderately increased risks of colon
and prostate cancer).
[Vol. 7:65
RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
mine the predictive value of a long family history of such
cancers. Likewise, research should collect information on males
as well as females in light of the "modestly elevated" levels of
prostate and colon cancer among those who inherit this
BRCA1 mutation.'
The Jewish tradition certainly would not object to such
research. Rather, it would actually push Jews to do as much as
we can to learn about this linkage so that hopefully one day
soon we can help people avoid cancer or, failing that, cure it.
This comes from the fundamental principle discussed previous-
ly regarding the Jewish attitude toward medicine, namely, that
human medical research and practice are not violations of
God's prerogatives but, on the contrary, some of the ways in
which we fulfill our obligations to be God's partners in the
ongoing act of creation. We must, of course, insure that respect
for persons, honesty, disclosure of risks, balance of risks and
benefits, and the other moral canons of medical research are
upheld in the process of conducting this study. Since we have
initial evidence that this line of inquiry may be fruitful in at-
taining our medical goals of preventing or curing some kinds
of cancer, however, we have, from a Jewish perspective, not
only the right, but the duty to pursue this investigation to the
extent that we can.
Determining exactly what that extent is requires that we
balance our expenditure of time, money, and energy on this
type of research with other medical efforts which seem prom-
ising. Furthermore, we must balance all medical research
against other necessary social functions and goals. Within these
bounds, Jewish theology and law certainly confirms and en-
courages all efforts to learn more about this genetic linkage
and how genetic engineering may be helpful in preventing or
curing the ailments which the mutation fosters or causes.
2. The Medical Care of Those Affected
Moral problems abound, though, when we turn from the
question of whether further research should be done to the
arena of medical practice, both now and in the future. Should
48. See Struewing et al., supra note 38, at 199.
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we, for example, recommend testing for this mutation to all
Ashkenazi Jews, or only to those for whom other factors iden-
tify them as being at-risk? If the tests show that a person has
the mutation, what should be done with regard to the person,
that person's children, to that person's future concepti? Does
that person's fianc6e have a right to know about the gene in
his or her intended mate? Finally, in the future, if and when we
develop the ability to affect this gene through genetic engineer-
ing, should we fix each fetus on a case-by-case basis, or should
we attempt to affect the germ cells as well so as to protect
future generations?
As difficult and as new as these questions are in the histo-
ry of the Jewish tradition, we should minimally draw the out-
lines of a Jewish approach to these questions. As the research-
ers suggest, before testing every Ashkenazi Jew for the muta-
tion, with the attendant financial and emotional costs involved,
we should engage in further research to determine exactly who
is at risk.
Once we have learned not only to identify those at risk but
also to cure the disease through techniques of genetic engi-
neering or other methods, there would be, in my view, a posi-
tive obligation for people in the group at risk to undergo the
test. There would be a second positive obligation of those
found to have the mutation to undergo the procedures neces-
sary to correct it so that they do not suffer from the forms of
cancer associated with it. When medicine has advanced to that
stage, these duties would be exactly equivalent to the obliga-
tions of everyone to seek to avoid disease and, if stricken, to
try to cure it. That is, the Jewish imperatives to prevent and
cure illness are no different for genetically engendered diseases
than they are for those which come from bacteria, viruses, or
any other environmental factor. In all cases of illness, whatever
its origin, Jews have the duty to try to prevent illness if at all
possible and to cure it when they can.
The hard issues, of course, arise at the stage of research in
which we find ourselves now, and undoubtedly will find our-
selves for some years, namely, there is evidence of a genetic
linkage to several forms of cancer, but we cannot change the
gene to avert the disease.
Once again, the first order of business is to identify more
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accurately the at-risk group. Once that has been done, it seems
to me that those in that group would have the duty to be test-
ed, even before we can effect a cure through genetic engineer-
ing. I base this duty on two premises: First, if the test proves
positive, that will alert a woman to be more vigilant in per-
forming self-examinations of her breasts and in having regular
checkups by her doctor. It would also encourage her to engage
in these diagnostic practices earlier in her life than she normal-
ly would. Second, the test will at least open the possibility to
her of a radical mastectomy in an effort to prevent breast can-
cer. Often, not all the breast tissue is successfully removed in
such procedures, but this course of action may nevertheless
reduce the probability of contracting cancer. Even though we
cannot currently guarantee a cure, the test for the BRCA1 gene
is sufficiently therapeutic even now to make it mandatory as a
Jewish religious obligation for the at-risk group to undergo the
test.
It should be clear that, unlike the case of Tay-Sachs, the
point of such testing would not be to provide the opportunity
to abort a fetus carrying the BRCA1 mutation. After all, the
current state of medical research on this gene indicates that
there is a strong statistical correlation between at least one
subset of people who have this mutation and the expression of
that mutation in forms of cancer. However, even for that sub-
set, the incidence of cancer is not one hundred percent. Like-
wise, even for those within this subset who do contract cancer,
the age at which the disease begins to manifest itself varies
widely.49 Furthermore, environmental factors clearly play a
role, along with genetic predispositions such as those caused
by BRCA1 mutations, in determining whether cancer will
occur at all in inheritors of BRCA1 mutations and, if so, at
49. See id. at 198. The researchers report that "[b]ased on studies in very high-risk families,
the estimated lifetime penetrance for breast cancer among mutation carriers is about 90% .... The
risk of ovarian cancer is lower, but may be as high as 84% in a subset of families." Id. Note that
these numbers are for those families at the greatest risk for developing cancer in the first place,
based on both a family history of the disease and the presence of BRCAI mutations, and note also
that these numbers are over a lifetime. As they report on the same page, "it can be estimated that
the 185delAG mutation might account for 16% of breast cancers (range 7.9-23.1%) and 39% of
ovarian cancers (range 22 -49%) diagnosed in Ashkenazi women before age 50." Id. As bad as





These factors would suggest that some medical and envi-
ronmental therapies which are now available may be used by
those who have the mutation to delay the onset of the cancer,
perhaps for decades, or to cure it once it has begun to invade
the body. Even without such therapies, affected women gen-
erally live at least several decades before developing cancer
and may, in the meantime, produce children of their own.
Furthermore, by that time means of preventing the mutation
from expressing itself as cancer or a cure for such cancers may
be found.
The possibility of using currently available methods to
prevent, delay, or cure threatened cancers makes it a positive
duty of Jews within the at-risk population for BRCA1 (as
defined by future research) to be tested and, if one is an in-
heritor of the mutation, to follow the advice of physicians in
employing whatever techniques or medications are available at
the time to ward off or cure the disease Because some such
therapies are now available, and because the affected person
will generally live for several decades before the onset of any
cancer caused by the gene, the presence of the mutation in a
fetus definitely does not warrant aborting it. (In this respect the
case of the BRCA1 mutation is closer to the case of carriers of
Huntington's Chorea than to victims of Tay-Sachs.)
Our current information does not suggest that children
should be tested. At present, nothing can be done in childhood
to benefit the child that could not be done just as effectively
later. It is, therefore, better to wait until the child is older and
can make decisions for herself concerning the proper course of
action.
Some of the women who suffer from breast cancer con-
tract the disease as early as their twenties. Thus, it becomes a
positive duty in Jewish law for teenagers in at-risk families to
be tested. The objective of testing for the 185delAG mutation
at that time is to alert teenagers as to whether they indeed
carry this genetic mutation so that they are forewarned to do
50. See RiskAssessment and Religion, 11 NATURE GENETICS 105-06 (1995) (discussing the
correlation between DDT and other pesticides and chemical pollution with the development of
cancer).
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two things: (1) to perform self-examinations to test for any
incidence of cancer much earlier and much more frequently
than the general population is advised to do; and (2) to consult
their physician earlier and more frequently than is common so
that they can be treated for any cancer which does occur at the
earliest sign of onset.
The duty for at-risk teenagers to be tested at that time
derives from the general Jewish obligation to preserve life and
health. Of course, if the woman can achieve the goal of pre-
venting or curing the disease without the test through some
other regimen of medical care, that would satisfy the require-
ments of Jewish law: the duty is to take reasonable steps to
prevent and cure disease, not to adopt a specific protocol to
accomplish those ends.
Traditionally, Jews become adults in Jewish law at the age
of twelve-and-a-half for girls and thirteen for boys; at those
ages they become liable for all of the duties and prohibitions of
Jewish law. That gives a legal framework in Jewish law to
support the timing of the onset of this duty in one's teenage
years.
3. Informing Prospective Spouses
Do affected women have the duty to inform their prospec-
tive mates of their condition? I think they do, but the answer to
this is not as obvious as one might suppose. The Jewish tradi-
tion places a premium on truth and honesty in speech, business
practices, and in personal relations.5 It recognizes, though,
that there are some times in life where tact should take prece-
dence over truth. That is, truth is a critical value, but not an
absolute one.
Specifically, there are two classical cases where truth is
51. Some biblical verses emphasize the importance and imperative of truth: see, e.g.,
Torah, Exodus 18:21; Prophets, Zechariah 8:16, 19; Writings, Psalms 15:2, 24:3-4; Writings,
Proverbs 12:19, 23:23. Conversely, the Torah says, "from falsehood you should stay far away"
(Exodus 23:7) and "You shall not deal deceitfully or falsely with one another .... You shall not
defraud your fellow .... (Leviticus 19:11, 13). According to the rabbis, God's very seal is truth
(Midrash Rabbah, Genesis 81:2) the world is preserved by truth, justice, and peace (Mishnah,
Avot 1:18) and, in sum, "[o]ne's 'yes' should be yes, and one's 'no' should be no" (Babylonian
Talmud, Bava Mezia 49a). Cf. Mishnah, Bava Mezia 4:2; Jerusalem Talmud, Berakhot 1:8 (3c);
Ruth Rabbah 7:6 citing Ruth 3:18.
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set aside in the name of some other good. According to the
School of Shammai, one describes a bride on her wedding day
as she is, whether she be beautiful or ugly, but the law follows
the School of Hillel who maintain that on her wedding day one
describes her as beautiful no matter what the case may actually
be. 2 In addition, when a person may die of a disease but also
may live, there is some support within the tradition to keep the
worst possible prognosis from a dying patient in the name of
supporting the person's efforts to be healed and his or her hope
to get better.5 3 In each case, the critical question is whether
there is a pragmatic benefit for the person in being told the
truth. When there is, it must be told. However, when there is
not, it may be withheld if other values like good feeling, hope,
and healing may be achieved by doing so.
In our case, the woman, by hypothesis, knows of the mu-
tation and knows of its strong linkage to breast and ovarian
cancer. A potential mate has a need to know that information
for two reasons. First, the man has a right to know that his
wife has a special propensity for cancer in making the decision
of whether or not to marry the woman. When we marry, we
always know that situations which we cannot predict will un-
doubtedly occur and that part of the marriage bond is the
agreement to support one another if and when such occasions
arise. When one partner knows ahead of time, though, that she
is particularly prone to cancer, it is only fair that her potential
husband be told so that he can make his commitment to mar-
riage with informed consent. (This is not, incidentally, a male-
female issue: the same would be true for a man who bears this
mutation since his female children may be specially at risk
and, for all we know, he or his male children may be particu-
larly at risk for specific cancers too.)
Second, the man has the right to know of the woman's
genetic mutation because the threat of his wife being afflicted
with these cancers would undoubtedly require them to have
children early in their marriage. That in turn, may well influ-
52. Babylonian Talmud, Ketubbot 16b-17a.
53. See generally BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIME:
SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 47-66 (1984) (summarizing and discussing halakhic requirements
for informing terminally ill patients about their prognoses).
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ence their professional and personal plans. In these respects the
man has a right to know of her condition.
4. Retaining an Appropriate Perspective and Attitude
It clearly is anything but pleasant to find out that you or a
member of your family is in the at-risk population for the
cancers which the BRCA1 mutation causes - or, at least,
seems to cause. Indeed, one might understandably feel fright-
ened about the future and angry at God or simply at your terri-
ble luck for being so afflicted. It all seems so unfair, so dread-
ful, and so utterly terrifying. On the other hand, if you discover
that you yourself are not at-risk, the relief you feel is often
immediately followed by a sense of guilt for being spared, akin
to the "survivor guilt" experienced by some Holocaust survi-
vors. This "survivor guilt" is compounded with anxiety about
the futures of those relatives who were not so lucky.
Jews inherit a tradition which prizes medicine, and so they
are prone to go overboard in tending to their care. Faced with
a diagnosis of bearing the BRCA1 mutation, they may take the
reasonable Jewish concern with preserving life and health to an
extreme, obsessing over their fate.
Such a reaction would be unhealthy and, therefore, con-
trary to what Jewish norms would have Jews do. It is un-
healthy because modes of therapy are currently available. Fur-
thermore, the chances of their success are likely to be dimin-
ished if the individual becomes exhausted with worry. One cer-
tainly cannot be expected to be calm and collected; however,
the best chances for cure require both the physical and mental
cooperation of the patient in trying to prevent the disease or in
curing it if it occurs. Because such a demeanor presents the
best hope for prevention or recovery, Jewish law mandates that
affected people do their best to engage in therapy conscien-
tiously, but in as even-tempered a mood as possible. Toward
that end, patients should avail themselves of the communal
support which they can gain from their synagogues, and they




E. Applying These Principles and Precedents to BRCA1 in
the Future
In the future, if we are able to prevent cancer through
some form of genetic repair of the mutation in utero or after
birth, every rabbi who has written about such therapeutic possi-
bilities, whether Reform, Conservative, or Orthodox, welcomes
them.54 The legal questions surrounding genetic engineering
focus on using the technique for changing characteristics of the
fetus which are not a disease. In addition, there is the
overarching theological consideration, that is, when do we
cross the line, if ever, between acting as God's legitimate part-
ners in perfecting creation and, on the other hand, illegitimately
preempting God's role such that we effectively play God?
While the material on these questions from a Jewish per-
spective is very sparse, it is interesting that an Orthodox rabbi
finds grounds within the tradition to use genetic techniques
even for enhancing the human being for non-medical purposes.
Specifically, Rabbi Azriel Rosenfeld uses the Talmudic sugges-
tions to prospective parents for having handsome and learned
children as grounds for using genetic engineering techniques
for accomplishing the same or similar ends, but not for dimin-
ishing the status of the fetus:
Our sages recognize, and perhaps even encourage, the use of
prenatal (or better, pre-conceptual) influences to improve one's
offspring:
Rabbi Yohanan used to go and sit at the gates of the place
of immersion [that is, the pool where women immersed
themselves after their menstrual period so that they might
resume sexual relations with their husbands], saying:
'When the daughters of Israel come out from their re-
54. See, e.g., David Golinkin, Response: Does Jewish Law Permit Genetic Engineering on
Humans? 19 MOMENT, Aug. 1994, at 28, 29, 67 (explaining a Conservative position on genetic
engineering). For Orthodox views, refer to Azriel Rosenfeld, Judaism and Gene Design, in
JEWISH BioETics 401,401-08 (Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979); Fred Rosner, Genetic
Engineering and Judaism, in JEWISH BioETHics 409, 409-20 (Fred Rosner & David Bleich eds.,
1979) (explaining Orthodox perspectives on genetic manipulation or engineering recombinant
DNA technology and research on gene splicing, nuclear transplants (cloning), and artificial
insemination). For a Reform position, see WALTER JACOB, QUESTIONS AND REFORM JEWISH
ANSWERS: NEW AMERICAN REFORM RESPONSA 252 (1992) (discussing the Reform position on
genetic engineering); JACOB, CONTEMPORARY RESPONSA, supra note 33, at 32-34 (answering
questions about in vitro revitalization and genetic engineering from a Reform perspective).
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quired immersion, they look at me and may have sons
who are as handsome as I and as accomplished in Torah
as .1
55
This concept might well be extended to allow the use of gene-
surgical techniques to produce physically and mentally superior
children. On the other hand, turning a person into a monster by
surgical means would very likely be forbidden, unless it were
necessary to save his life; and creating monsters through gene
surgery might thus also be forbidden.56
On the other hand, Conservative Rabbi David Golinkin specifi-
cally restricts the Jewishly legitimate use of gene therapy to the
prevention or cure of diseases, reasoning that the sources
which permit Jews to get involved in medicine in the first
place only speak of using it for therapeutic purposes. I would
imagine that Rabbi Golinkin would respond to the Talmudic
source that Rabbi Rosenfeld adduces by maintaining that the
source does not intend to announce law in the first place but
rather only to give advice (or show how egotistical Rabbi
Yohanan was). As an alternative, if it is to be construed as a
legal precedent, it only permits people to look at images of, or
imagine, the qualities they wish in their child, not to change
nature to accomplish their end.
Certainly, the way Jews read such sources and the way
Jews contemplate the eugenic possibilities of genetic engineer-
ing must be both colored in our day by the cruel Nazi experi-
ments which were ostensibly for the same goal. Those experi-
ments make it vividly clear that while some changes in human
genetics are undoubtedly therapeutic, others raise troubling
questions about the criteria for judging what constitutes a good
change." If it becomes possible to treat or reverse the BRCA1
mutation linked to cancer, every rabbi, I take it, would con-
55. Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 20a; Babylonian Talmud, Bava Mezia 84a. This is a
Jewish version of Roman eugenics, for, according to the Talmud, the Roman notables used to hold
beautiful figures while engaging in sexual relations. See Rosenfeld, supra note 54, at 407 n.3. Cf.
Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 58a. See also Numbers Rabbah 9:34 (ascribing the fact that an
Ethiopian couple produced a white child to their house having white figures in it). On analogous
procedures involving animals, see Torah, Genesis 30:37-40 and Babylonian Talmud, Avodah
Zarah 24a.
56. See Rosenfeld, supra note 54, at 403.
57. See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORs AND
THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTs IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (1992).
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strue that as Jewishly legitimate. However, careful lines must
be drawn and clear criteria formulated to define proper usages
of this technique. Likewise, we must at all costs avoid improp-
er or even monstrous usages.
The second legal question and the theological question
posed above are related: if we change not only this mutation,
but the germ line of all present inheritors of BRCA1, have we
stepped over the line between our legitimate powers to cure
and changed ourselves into virtual gods, or are we simply and
legitimately preventing disease more effectively? I do not know
of any rabbinic responses directly on point, but I would imag-
ine that, given the principles described above, Jews would
permit germ line changes only if they were clearly therapeutic
according to a clear definition of what constitutes a disease and
what does not. In other words, the more powerful our abilities
to intervene in preventing genetic diseases, the more urgent it
becomes that we accomplish the philosophical and moral tasks
described in the last paragraph.
As we learn more ways to change human genetics, some
ancient theological images come increasingly to mind. Are we
Prometheus in trying to steal the fire from the gods, or the
people of Babel trying to build a tower to heaven, or are we
God's covenanted partners who were entrusted with the world
"to work it and guard it," as the Bible says in the Garden of
Eden story?58 Drawing these lines and reinterpreting these
ancient stories will become more and more the surprising, but
critical, subject of medical ethics.
58. Torah, Genesis 2:16.
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